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Issue2

COURT REPORTS

the mandamus jurisdiction to lie, plaintiffs must show the defendant
violated a clear, nondiscretionary duty owed to plaintiffs. Because the
court evaluated the actions of the Corps and the EPA and concluded
that their failure to revoke the "dredge or fill" permit issued to the City
of Cleveland was discretionary, the court held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Olmstead Falls' mandamus claim against the
Corps and the EPA.
For the reasons set forth, the court found that there was no waiver
of sovereign immunity on the part of the Corps or the EPA and that
the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Olmstead
Falls' claims against the government agencies.
Mark Shea

Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment disallows monetary damages against officials
acting in their official capacity; the right to seek redress via federal
statutory authority for a violation of independently existing
constitutional rights exists even if the same set of facts also give rise to
a cause of action for a violation of statutory rights; a regulation goes
"too far" if it deprives the individual of all economically beneficial use
of his or her property and it does not substantially advance state
interests; a regulatory taking may occur if state officials ignore their
statutory and regulatory obligations; a specific Fifth Amendment
takings cause of action subsumes a more general Fourteenth
Amendment takings cause of action; and notice of conduct potentially
in violation of the Constitution prevents the qualified immunity
defense).
Edward Swartz ("Swartz") owned and operated a 280-acre ranch in
Campbell County, Wyoming. Swartz filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming against Gary Beach and
Dennis Hemmer ("Officials") individually and in their official
capacities as Administrator and Director respectively of the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality Division
("WDEQ"). Swartz also named as a defendant Redstone Resources,
Inc. ("RRI"), a Colorado corporation, who operated a gas company
producing coal bed methane ("CBM") in the Powder River Basin of
Wyoming. Swartz's suit alleged the taking of private property without
just compensation or due process by the Officials' failure to perform
statutory and regulatory duties without due process. Furthermore,
Swartz sought to enjoin defendants from allowing discharge of
contaminated water in violation of his constitutional rights and federal
and state environmental laws.
The Officials and RRI filed
independent motions to dismiss the compliant. The court granted the
Officials' motion to dismiss to the extent the complaint sought
monetary damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity
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and to the extent the complaint sought to require the officials to
comply with Wyoming state law. The court denied the motion to
dismiss in all other aspects, and it denied RRI's motion to dismiss in its
entirety.
This suit arose when RRI's discharge water produced by coal bed
methane wells flowed though Swartz's ranch. As a result, the creek,
which Swartz used for irrigation of his hay meadows, had insufficient
flow to allow for irrigation during the summer months. Furthermore,
the discharge water caused permanent soil damage due to its elevated
salinity and sodium absorption ratios. Swartz claimed RRI and the
Officials deprived him of his adjudicated water rights in 2000 and
2001. RRI and the Officials each filed independent motions to dismiss
the claims.
The court denied RRI's motion to dismiss for three reasons. First,
the court found that Swartz pled sufficient facts to state a claim for a
violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Swartz brought his claim
under the CWA's citizen suit provision alleging an ongoing violation of
state-imposed "effluent standards or limitations." Secondly, the court
found because Swartz issued a "Notice of Citizen Suit Under the Clean
Water Act," the court maintained subject matter jurisdiction over
Swartz's CWA claims. Finally, the court held Swartz did not fail to join
necessary or indispensable parties because even though others
produced discharge water into the creek, those parties are not
indispensable.
The Officials argued several different elements in their motion to
dismiss. They first argued the court lacked both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction based on the Eleventh Amendment. A plaintiff
may obtain relief against a state under the ex parte Young doctrine,
which says a federal district court may retain jurisdiction over a suit
against a state official in his official capacity to prevent a continuing
violation of the law, notwithstanding a state's sovereign immunity. The
Eleventh Amendment permits suits seeking prospective relief if the
plaintiff files suit against the official rather than the sovereign state.
Swartz sought prospective injunctive relief preventing a continuing
violation of federal and state environmental laws, and therefore the
court retained jurisdiction. Swartz also sought punitive damages,
which may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual
capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct attributable to the
officer himself so long as the relief sought comes from the officer
personally. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss to the
extent Swartz sought monetary damages against the Officials while
they acted in their official capacity. The court denied the motion for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Officials moved to dismiss, in the same motion, Swartz's claim
based on federal statutory authority because Swartz used it as a vehicle
to bring his private takings claims, which were based on alleged
violations of the CWA. The court denied the Officials' motion relying
on the National Sea Clammers doctrine, which does not restrict a
plaintiff's right to seek redress via federal statutory authority for the
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violation of independently existing constitutional rights even if the
same set of facts also give rise to a cause of action for a violation of
statutory rights.
The Officials also moved to dismiss the cause of action for the
taking of private property without just compensation. The court
denied the motion because Swartz alleged sufficient facts to state a
claim for a physical taking by the Officials. Similarly, Swartz alleged a
regulatory taking of his land. A government regulation can constitute
a taking if the regulation makes it commercially impracticable to
engage in the economic activity under construction or goes "too far."
A regulation goes "too far" if it deprives the individual of all
economically beneficial use of his or her property and it does not
substantially advance state interests. Here, Swartz did not allege that
the Officials deprived him of all economically beneficial uses of his
land. Therefore, the court conducted a fact specific inquiry. The
court found the Officials' inaction failed to advance a legitimate
government interest, and the Officials effectuated a regulatory taking
by ignoring their statutory and regulatory obligations despite Swartz's
requests that they take action.
In order for his takings claim to be ripe, Swartz had to prove the
state deprived him of his property and refused to compensate him for
the deprivation. The Officials argued that because Swartz did not
properly file the claim, Swartz did not request compensation from the
state thus making his claim not ripe. The court, however, held the
claims were ripe for review because the government entity charged
with implementing the regulations reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations on the property issue, because
Swartz sought compensation through state procedures for the
deprivation of his property and because Swartz made a sufficient
allegation of an actual and concrete injury.
The Officials claimed the more particular Fifth Amendment
takings cause of action subsumed the general Fourteenth Amendment
takings cause of action. The court agreed, citing a previous Tenth
Circuit Court holding, "because... the Fifth Amendment imposes very
specific obligations upon the government.., we are reluctant in the
context of a factual situation that falls squarely within that clause to
impose new and potentially inconsistent obligations upon the parties
under the substantive or procedural components of the Due Process
Clause." Therefore, the court denied the Fourteenth Amendment
takings cause of action.
Finally, as another effort in their motion to dismiss the claim, the
Officials claimed qualified immunity. However, the court held
because Swartz brought suit against the Officials in both their official
and individual capacities and Swartz adequately put the Officials on
notice based on his continued efforts to have the Officials enforce
their statutory and regulatory obligation, the Officials failed to meet
the requirements for qualified immunity.
In summation, the court denied RRI's motion to dismiss in its
entirety. With respect to the Officials' motion to dismiss, the court
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granted the motion to the extent the complaint sought monetary
damages against the Officials acting in their official capacity and to the
extent the complaint sought to require the Officials to comply with
Wyoming state law. The court denied the Officials' motion in all other
respects.
Staci A. McComb

Ozark Soc'y v. Melcher, 229 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
holding that defendant's issuance of conditioned dam construction
permit was a final agency action; plaintiffs had standing to bring suit
against defendant; and plaintiffs' claims were ripe).
This case arose when several river advocacy groups ("Ozark
Society") sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
The Ozark Society claimed the Corps, in issuing a conditioned
construction permit for a dam on Arkansas' Bear Creek, failed to
follow certain procedural mandates. These mandates were found in
the Buffalo National River enabling legislation, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Federal Water Pollution and
Control Act. The Corps filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, alleging that: (1) no final agency action had
occurred; (2) the Ozark Society lacked standing to bring this suit; and
(3) Ozark Society's claims were not yet ripe. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas disagreed with each of the Corps'
allegations and denied the motion to dismiss.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), only final
agency actions are subject to judicial review. On August 3, 2001, the
Corps issued a permit to the Searcy County Regional Water District
("Searcy County") for construction of a dam on Bear Creek.
Generally, the issuance of such a permit is a final agency action.
However, the Corps conditioned the permit given to Searcy County,
requiring further action by the Corps, other federal agencies, and
Searcy County before construction could begin. The conditions had
not yet been met at the time of this suit. The Corps argued that a final
agency action would only occur upon fulfillment of these conditions,
as until then the permit could still be revoked for noncompliance.
However, the court held that it is issuance of a permit, not the meeting
of attached conditions, which comprises a final agency action. As the
Corps issued the permit, it had taken a judicially reviewable final
action.
The Corps also argued that the Ozark Society lacked standing
because it had not yet suffered an injury in fact, and because its
injuries were not redressable by the court. In support, the Corps
noted that the proposed dam might never be built. However, the
court stated that the procedural requirements ensured that any
proposed dam would not have an adverse effect, either on Bear Creek

